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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a novel approach of applying stated preference methods 
in the field of labour economics. Differences in behaviour and labour market 
disadvantage are connected to the presence, and ages of children, the so-
called „family gap‟. There are major difficulties in collecting accurate 
information about the recruiting practices of employers and identifying their 
preferences towards different characteristics of new recruits. Employer 
answers to direct questions may not illicit reliable answers due to them having 
unconscious biases, confounding various potential employee characteristics, 
social or legal pressures on not appearing to be biased against certain types 
of potential employees or them practicing discrimination. This paper applies 
stated preference methods to identifying employer preferences to three sets 
of characteristics of potential recruits: age, gender and presence and age of 
their youngest child. This method is tested using face-to-face interviews with 
52 firms. The results indicate that there are strong employer preferences 
against those: having childcare responsibilities for children aged under 5; and 
being over 50 years old. Employer preferences favour: those between the 
ages of 25 and 39; those with no childcare responsibilities; and women. This 
suggests that the influences of age, gender and children are crucial factor 
when discussing gender and labour demand.  
 
Key Words: Employer Preferences; Recruitment; Stated Preference Methods; 
Labour Markets 
JEL: J16, J70, J71, D30, A14 
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Employer Recruitment Preferences and 
Discrimination: A Stated Preference Experiment 
 
Introduction 
 
The personal and household characteristics of a job seeker may influence a 
potential employer in addition to the usual job and skills related factors such 
as qualifications and education and other human capital (e.g. Becker, 1971). 
However, there are major difficulties in collecting accurate information about 
the recruiting practices of employers and identifying their preferences towards 
different types or characteristics of new recruits. Employer answers to direct 
questions may not illicit reliable answers due to: them having unconscious 
biases; conflating various potential employee characteristics; social or legal 
pressures on not appearing to be biased against certain types of potential 
employees; or discrimination (see for instance, Howell, and Sims, 1994, on 
the unwillingness of voters to say they supported an racist candidate). This 
paper presents a novel use of Stated Preference analysis to identifying 
employers‟ preferences and applies it to particular characteristics of potential 
recruits: age, gender and presence of young children.  
 
Specifically the paper considers the influence of the age of job seeker, their 
gender and the age of their youngest child upon employer preferences. In 
terms of age, there is evidence concerning employer preferences against 
recruiting older workers (Johnson, 2007; Adams 2004; Borsch-Supan, 2003; 
Duncan, 2001). The reasons for this may include perceived lower productivity 
due to poorer health, lower levels of qualifications, perceived lower creativity 
and innovativeness. Wages tend to rise with age, until the mid-50s, (Mincer, 
1974), and older workers may be more difficult to sack due to legislation (e.g. 
workers over 40 in the US are covered by the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act). However, some loss of productivity among older workers 
may be due to skills obsolescence, rather than age (Skirbekk 2004). On the 
other hand, older workers may have greater life and work experience, longer 
tenures, lower turnover, less absenteeism and require less supervision than 
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younger workers (Johnson, 2007). There may also be supply-side factors 
which discourage older workers from applying or wanting work, such as early 
retirement or other benefits and the balance between consumption, savings, 
leisure and other responsibilities, such as caring for a spouse or grandchildren 
(Hurd, 1990). 
 
There is a large literature on gender variations in wages and careers for both 
labour demand- and supply-side reasons. Largely supply-side factors include 
differing: human capital (Blau and Kahn 2003; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994); 
motivations and attitudes; prevalence of part-time; the effect of breaks or 
other differences in work history between female parents and others, due to 
leaving work or working part-time because of childcare responsibilities (Budig 
and England, 2001; Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Dex et al., 1998; Waldfogel, 
1997, 1998).1 Largely demand-side factors include:  occupations, with 
Manning and Petrongolo (2008) arguing that the part-time versus full-time pay 
penalty is almost entirely due to occupational segregation; characteristics of 
employers that women concentrate in, including unionisation, firm size, 
government and industrial sector (for example: Cohen and Hoffman, 2003; 
Grimshaw; 2000; Olsen and Walby, 2004); and discrimination (Becker, 1971; 
Joshi and Paci, 1998; Neumark, 1988; Wright and Ermisch, 1991).   
 
In terms of children and gender, differences in behaviour and labour market 
position are connected to the presence, and ages, of children of female 
parents, the so-called „family gap‟. There is a growing literature identifying that 
differences in behaviour and labour market disadvantage is strongly 
connected to the presence, and ages, of children for female parents, with 
some arguing that this „family gap‟ may be more important than the gender 
gap (Joshi et al., 1999; Paull, 2006). While wage differences between full-time 
men and women have been narrowing in the UK, these have been diverging 
for part-time women, (Gregory and Connelly, 2008). Career breaks, due to 
childcare responsibilities, are often seen as a major determinant of gender 
pay differences (Manning and Robinson, 2004; Hakim, 2004), occupational 
                                                 
1
 In this paper the presence of young children, refers to the job seeker having primary 
responsibility for childcare, whom we will refer to, for simplicity, as their parent.  
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prestige and job quality (Malo and Muñoz-Bullon, 2007). For instance two-
thirds of women in a longitudinal study by Stewart and Greenhalgh (1984) had 
had a break in their career and work experience and only around half went 
back to the equivalent occupational status afterwards.  Using British 
Household Panel data, Booth and van Ours (2008, p. F98) argue that a 
women‟s labour market position is mainly influenced by the presence of 
children and their ages. In particular women without children or who have 
children over 12 years old are less likely to be in part-time work.  
 
On the supply-side, parents may wish to spend more time with their young 
child (or children) and feel that their presence at home is particularly important 
for the child‟s development in the early years.2 There may also be problems 
with the availability of childcare, especially before the child goes to Primary 
School at around 5 year old (after which the childcare costs should reduce 
significantly as they will be at school much of the day). After the child reaches 
Secondary school age, at around 12 years, mothers are more likely to go 
back to longer work hours or full-time work as the children are more 
independent, need less childcare and spend more time in school. If the parent 
returns to full-time work at this stage, they are still likely to suffer long-term 
career disadvantage, as they may have missed out on the early career 
develop stages compared to contemporary men and women who did not have 
children (or men who did have children), and also their commitment, 
aspirations and confidence in their future career may be more limited.  
 
On the demand-side, there may be reluctance by employers to recruit parents 
with small children or those who may potentially have children in the near 
future. Two particular reasons for this are, first, workers with young children 
may be perceived, which may or may not be correct, to have lower 
productivity. This may be due to perceptions of them: being less flexible (for 
example in terms of hours they can work, days or periods they are 
                                                 
2
 This primarily relates to mothers of young children, who currently take the major role in 
childcare responsibilities. Paull (2008) found that a child‟s birth had little impact on the hours a 
man worked, although after the first birth there was considerable movement towards part-time 
work for women which continued for the next 10 years and to a degree for the rest of their 
lives. Of course men may also be similarly disadvantaged if they take the major childcare role. 
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unavailable, geographical area they can work in and the ability to change 
hours at short notice); being more likely to take more time off due to sickness 
or childcare arrangements for their children; having lower levels of work 
commitment or willingness to take on added responsibility; and requiring 
greater management or supervisory time to deal with, for example in creating 
fixed work rotas for them.  
 
Second, the presence of young children may be taken as a signal for the 
probability of having another child. In many countries, including those in the 
European Union such as the UK, the parent would be entitled to maternity 
leave which would result in various associated employer costs (such as 
maternity pay, loss of work time, hiring and wage costs of replacement staff 
etc.). So being a parent with young children may act as a signal for an 
employer indicating a perceived increase in the probability of such future 
costs (other such signals may be age and gender). These may lead to 
discrimination whereby employers avoid recruiting young parents. 
 
Hence an important question is whether the disadvantage in the labour 
market, including the low wages and disrupted career patterns, are due to: a 
women‟s choices (e.g. preferring not to work or work part-time so as to look 
after a child, at least until they reach Primary school; or having to stay at 
home due to the non-availability or cost of childcare); their human capital and 
other characteristics; and/or employers‟ bias or discrimination.3 This paper 
focuses specifically upon the latter issue: the attitudes of employers to those 
with young children. 
  
The next section briefly considers some models of employer discrimination in 
terms of having biased preferences, particularly statistical discrimination. 
Section 3 sets out an overview of the use of state preference methods. 
Section 4 presents the methodology followed in section 5 by the results of an 
                                                 
3
 There may be other advantages or disadvantages beyond wage levels, such as job 
satisfaction, or stress. For instance, Booth and van Ours (2008) found that women have 
higher hours and job satisfaction if they work part-time (irrespective of the length of hours per 
week) but their life satisfaction was greater if they worked full-time compared to part-time but 
not statistically significantly so (although any working was better than not working), while job 
and life satisfactions for men are not affected by their hours of work.  
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experiment where the method was tested using face-to-face interviews with a 
sample of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the UK. The final 
section presents conclusions. 
 
 
Discrimination and employer preferences 
 
Much has been written on employment discrimination by gender, ethnicity, 
age and so on. There are a number of discrimination models such as: 
Becker‟s (1971) taste model (Altonji and Blank, 1999); the crowding out 
model, where females are concentrated or „crowded‟ within a relatively small 
number of occupations or sectors and hence the large supply of labour keeps 
the wages low, while the opposite may happen in some „men‟s occupations‟ 
(Pike, 1984, p. 3); dual labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) and job 
ladders models, where men and women may have the same job related 
abilities, but women have greater links to and ability in non-paid job activities, 
including household and childcare activities (Lazear and Rosen, 1990). An 
interesting experiment by Weichselbaumer (2003) found that while there was 
a negative effect of Lesbian orientation when applications were sent in 
response to advertisements by employers, but gender identity did not appear 
to have a significant overall impact on the chances of hiring. 
 
In this paper, of particular importance is statistical discrimination where 
employers exhibit preferences for or against certain groups, due to imperfect 
information about individual applicants. Here employers take membership of a 
group (e.g. mothers with young children, or older job seekers) as a signal 
which is seen as providing information concerning the person‟s productivity, 
as some information is unobservable at the level of the individual (Altonji and 
Pierret, 2001; Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972). If, for instance, two applicants are 
identical in terms of their skills and experience etc. then rather than choosing 
between the two people at random, the employer may ascribe the 
characteristics of a group to those of an individual job applicant based upon 
prior experience or otherwise.  
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In the case of a parent of a young child, the employer has personal may 
assume that potential worker from this group will have higher costs or lower 
productivity so they will act as if the real wage per hour of a parent is greater 
than the nominal cost. The model can be extended here to also incorporate 
the second issue discussed above, which is where having a young child is 
seen as a signal for a high likelihood of having another child in the near term.  
This would be the cost of maternity leave etc. as discussed above, discounted 
down to the average hourly rate spread over the period that the employee is 
likely to remain in employment with the employer. It may also be weighted by 
the ease of replacement of a staff member going on maternity leave, so if 
there was difficulty of attracting an equivalent worker to cover for the person 
on maternity leave, such as where the post has considerable firm specific 
skills and training, or there were other reasons that it would be difficult to find 
a temporary replacement to cover the maternity leave, then the value 
attributed to m would be greater. Hence the perceived hourly cost by the 
employer would be: 
wp(1 + I + φm)      (Eq. 1) 
 
where wp is the wage rate for parents, l is the perceived reduced productivity 
due to the lack of flexibility, increase time off etc. due to childcare, m is the 
cost of maternity leave and φ reflects the difficulty in replacing the employee 
during maternity leave.   
 
Given that equal pay and other legislation should ensure equal pay for 
equivalent work in countries such as the UK, then wp (wages of parents of 
young children) should equal wn (wages of non-parents), i.e. there would not 
be wage flexibility on the part of the employer. So if parents of young children 
and those without young children are perfect substitutes, then employers will 
avoid recruiting the former quality of parents.4 Generally legislation should 
enforce flexibility such as maternity leave (Dex and Sheibl, 2002), although 
                                                 
4
 It should be stressed that this paper concerns the recruitment of parents with young children 
and not the retention of existing employees who already have young children or have a baby. 
In these cases the employer would more firmly be bound by legislation and also they would 
have a clearer knowledge of actual productivity of the staff member. 
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conscious or unconscious preferences may lead to a bias by some 
employers. 
 
Hence the employer can be seen as estimating l, m and φ (Eq. 1 above), on 
the basis of some expected probability based on their past experiences. For 
example, the employer may assume that a young woman will have a high 
probability of having a child in the near future, so that they are likely to take 
maternity leave, while assuming that even if a man of the same age has a 
child, it will not affect his work patterns. Similarly another woman without 
children, but with the same skills etc. may be viewed as less likely to have a 
child and so be chosen in preference to a woman with a young child. Even if 
these employer assumptions were not correct, it would still affect the hiring 
decision.  Hence in statistical discrimination a potential worker‟s productivity is 
uncertain and is seen as depending on factors that are difficult to measure in 
the formal application process Levitt (2004).5  
 
An important aspect is that a person can move between different groups over 
time, although much of the theory assumes a person stays in a specific group 
(e.g. gender). For instance, a woman might have a child and so move into the 
young mother group, or another woman‟s children may grow older and they 
move out of the group. So „group membership‟ will vary over time (other 
examples may be a person ageing or moving to a new address out of an area 
that may be „redlined‟ by employers).  In addition, over time the age of having 
the first child has risen, so a person may have an established career and 
more evidence of their personal productivity (e.g. through credible 
references). The time spent on maternity leave may also fall (as has been the 
trend in recent decades), partly due to their great income (and so affordability 
of childcare as well as greater opportunity cost of not working). 
 
This section has indicated that there may be employer preferences for not 
taking on certain groups. Some of this may be due to gender bias and some 
                                                 
5
 Modern strict recruitment processes try to minimise this by clearly seeking justification for all 
choices during the recruitment process. Statistical discrimination in society is common, for 
instance where older drivers may qualify for cheaper insurance than younger ones. 
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due to a bias against parents with young children. It has also been suggested 
that there may be a signalling effect (using the presence of young children to 
signal future maternity leave). In this case it may be that gender and young 
age of the job seeker may also be used as signalling devices. Hence the 
analysis seeks to control for gender and age, as well as the presence of 
young children. The next section describes the use of Stated Preference 
methods in order to consider the employers choice of whether or not to hire 
someone (which may be based upon statistical discrimination resulting from 
their perception of the effective real wage that would be paid for members of 
different groups). 
 
 
Stated Preference Methods 
 
Stated Preference (SP) analysis is useful in understanding the value and 
importance of goods and services that are difficult to analyse through the 
investigation of markets and prices. It is argued here that SP methods can 
be useful to measure the preferences of employers concerning potential 
recruits (or workers in general) and that through controlling for „other‟ key 
variables (by using scenarios) they can also take account of some 
unobserved heterogeneity among the respondents in terms of their attitudes 
towards different types of recruits.6 
 
Stated Preference methods rely on giving people hypothetical choices about a 
good or service, or in this case a potential recruit, then asking them to state 
what their choice or preference is among the allowable options. The person 
being questioned may state their preference by giving a monetary value or by 
selecting one option over all other options, depending on how the question is 
                                                 
6
 Another method by which a researcher can determine the employment prospects for 
potential recruits would be to investigate the actual hiring practices of employers in regard to 
applicant characteristics like gender, age and childcare responsibilities. This process would 
be a revealed preference analysis of the employer. The collection of accurate information on 
all formal and informal applicants is necessary for comparison with the characteristics of the 
applicant who is finally selected by the employer. If it were possible to collect all this 
information accurately, it would be possible to determine how job applicant characteristics 
impact on their employability. 
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framed. By examining how people respond to a range of choices it is possible 
to estimate their preference for a particular characteristic of a potential worker 
by using choice modelling.  
 
There have been useful experiments where employers have been 
approached with fictitious application forms etc. to determine their preferences 
or biases (e.g. Bertrand and Mullanaithan, 2004; Weichselbaumer, 2003). 
However, these are unlikely to be effective where a face to face interview with 
an employer is used and also may not identify characteristics not fully 
developed in an application form or unobserved factors influencing an 
employer in making their decisions. 
 
This paper uses a Choice Experiment (CE) - a technique that falls under the 
Choice Modelling (CM) framework.7 CEs are able to analyze separate and 
distinct characteristics of any potential job applicant. The object of this CE is 
to determine the relative strength of preference by employers for job 
applicants by gender, their own age, and the age of their (youngest) child. It is 
customary when using any SP methods to include a monetary characteristic 
(wage, in this case) in the questionnaire and to structure the hypothetical 
questions in such a manner as to monetarise the different characteristics 
being investigated.8  
 
The economic theory behind the use of choice experiments finds its origins in 
business marketing applications from the 1970‟s. Today, choice experiments 
are widely used particularly in environmental and transport economics (e.g. 
Leitham et al., 2000), housing (Walker et al., 2002) and also in health 
economics (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2003). The remainder of this section 
considers the characteristics theory of value and random utility theory, 
                                                 
7
 Within SP methods there are two groups of techniques, choice modelling (CM) and 
contingent valuation (CV). Contingent valuation concentrates on the good or service as a 
whole, while choice modelling examines peoples preferences for individual characteristics or 
attributes of the good or service. 
8
 This was not done in this research as it was believed participating employers may be 
reluctant to participate in the survey and the experiment was seeking to test if the methods in 
general could be applied successfully. However, there is no problem in principle of including 
monetarised values. 
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multinomial logit models and random parameters logit models as they apply to 
the issues discussed above. 
 
The Characteristics Theory of Value and Random Utility Theory   
 
Choice Experiments (CE) are based on two fundamental building blocks: 
Lancaster's characteristics theory of value, and random utility theory. 
Lancaster (1966) asserted that the utility derived from a good comes from the 
characteristics of that good, not from consumption of the good itself. Goods 
normally possess more than one characteristic and these characteristics (or 
attributes) will be shared with many other goods. The value of a good is then 
given by the sum of the value of its characteristics. Random Utility Theory 
(RUT) states that not all of the determinants of utility derived by individuals 
from their choices are directly observable by the researcher, but that an 
indirect determination of preferences is possible (McFadden, 1973; Manski, 
1977). The utility function for a representative consumer can be decomposed 
into observable and stochastic sections: 
          Uan = Van + εan      (Eq. 2) 
Where Uan is the latent, unobservable utility held by consumer n (or employer 
in the case of this study) for choice alternative a (or job seeker characteristic 
in the case of this study), Van is the systemic, or observable portion of utility 
that consumer n has for choice alternative a, and εan is the random or 
unobservable portion of the utility that consumer n has for choice alternative 
a. So the utility of an employer seeking to hire a person may relate to 
observable factors (such as the experience, skills, gender and age of a 
person), while unobservable factors may be how well they will fit into the 
workplace and whether or not they may take time off due to childcare or 
maternity reasons. Research is focused on a probability function, defined over 
the alternatives which an individual faces, assuming that the individual will try 
to maximise their utility (Bennett and Blamey, 2001; Louviere et al., 2000). 
This probability is expressed as:                                                                         
 P (a\Cn) = P [(Van + ean) > (Vjn + ejn)], ja  ,   (Eq. 3) 
for all j options in choice set Cn; a and n are as previously described; or: 
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P (a\Cn) = P [(Van-Vjn ) > (ejn - ean)],      ja  .   (Eq. 4) 
 To empirically estimate (4), and thus to estimate the observable 
parameters of the utility function, assumptions are made about the random 
component of the model. A typical assumption is that these stochastic 
components are independently and identically distributed (IID) with a Gumbel 
or Weibull distribution.  
 
Multinomial logit (MNL) models 
This leads to the use of multinomial logit (MNL) models (sometimes called 
conditional logit models) to determine the probabilities of choosing j options 
(Hanley, Mourato and Wright, 2001):  
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
  , ja       (Eq. 5) 
Here,  is a scale parameter, inversely related to the standard 
deviation of the error term and not separately identifiable in a single data set. 
The implications of this are that the estimated  ‟s cannot be directly 
interpreted as to their contribution to utility, since they are confounded with the 
scale parameter. When using the MNL model choices must satisfy the 
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, which means that 
the addition or subtraction of any option from the choice set will not affect 
relative probability of individual n choosing any other option (Louviere, et al., 
2000). Modelling constants known as alternative specific constants (ASCs) 
are typically included in the MNL model. The ASC accounts for variations in 
choices that are not explained by the attributes or socio-economic variables, 
and sometimes form a status quo bias (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). 
 
Random parameters logit (RPL) models 
Another econometric approach is the Random Parameters Logit (RPL) where 
the utility function for respondent n choosing over alternatives j (j=1,2,...J), Ujn, 
is augmented with a vector of parameters  that incorporate the individual 
preference deviations with respect to the mean preference values that are 
expressed by vector : 
 Ujn = Cj + kjk Xjkn +m m Smn Cj +k kn Xjkn + jn  (Eq. 6)  
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where Cj is an alternative specific constant (CJ=0, for identification purposes), 
Xjkn is the kth attribute value of the alternative j; jk is the coefficient 
associated with the kth attribute, Smn is the mth socio-economic characteristic 
of individual n, and m is the coefficient associated with the mth individual 
socio-economic characteristic. Note that socio-economic characteristics are 
invariant across choice occasions for each individual in the sample, so are 
interacted with the alternative specific constant. Furthermore, kn is a vector of 
k deviation parameters which represents the individual‟s tastes relative to the 
average () and jn is an un-observed random term which is independent of 
the other terms in the equation, and which is identically and independently 
Gumbel distributed. The researcher can estimate , γ and ;  the  terms, as 
they represent personal tastes, are assumed constant for a given individual 
across all the choices they make, but not constant across people. Random 
parameter logit probabilities are weighted averages of the logit formula 
evaluated at different values of , with the weights given by the density f().  
 
The probability that respondent n chooses alternative i is given by: 
      Pni = ∫ Lni (B) f (B) d(B)                 (Eq. 7) 
where Lni () is the logit probability evaluated at parameters . Since the 
integral (Eq. 7) has no closed form, parameters are estimated through 
simulation and maximizing the simulated log-likelihood function. In order to 
estimate the model it is necessary to make an assumption over how the  
coefficients are distributed over the population. Here we assume that 
preferences for all the job applicant characteristics follow a normal distribution 
which allows for both a positive and negative preference values. 
By conducting a choice experiment it is therefore possible to estimate the 
relative strength of preferences that employers have for job applicants based 
on three characteristics, gender, age and childcare responsibilities.  
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Methodology 
 
A total of 52 small and medium size businesses were interviewed face-to-
face. The firms were located in the UK. In addition to collecting information 
about the firm and their current employees each employer was given 11 cards 
like the illustration in the Annex. Each card had a different pairing of possible 
applicant profiles from which the employer was asked to indicate their 
preference. From this information it is possible to estimate the relative 
likelihood of a job applicant being selected or preferred based on the 
characteristics presented.  
 
Businesses were selected randomly from business databases and the 
numbers in each local government area were weighted approximately by 
population. Businesses were contacted by phone and letter. Interviews were 
requested with business owners and managers involved in the recruitment of 
new staff.  
 
The interview sought to characterise aspects of the business that may affect 
the likelihood that an individual with childcare responsibilities would be 
capable of undertaking employment within the business. To this end, 
interviews sought information on the volume of replacement and additional 
staff, recruitment methods, employer expectations of shop-floor level worker 
with regard to reliability, flexibility, adaptability, team working, timekeeping, 
honesty, absence rates and conscientiousness.  
 
Three worker characteristics critical to the recruitment decision making 
processes of employers were gender, age and age of children. Employers 
within SMEs were asked to express a preference for one of two possible 
candidates or leave the position vacant. The interviewee was allowed the 
option of leaving the position vacant to accurately reflect the options available 
to the business. Without this option the employer is faced with a conditional 
choice and forced to select a potential applicant which they may have 
otherwise rejected.  When the interviewee selects this option no observable 
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attributes exist and the choice is treated as a missing value in the analysis 
(Hensher et al., 2005) 
 
Differences between the two candidates were limited to gender, age and 
whether the individual had childcare responsibilities for children aged under 5 
years, children aged 5 to 11 or no childcare responsibilities at all, i.e. no 
children under 12. The ages of the hypothetical candidates varied from young 
(25 or less), 25 to 39; 40 to 49; 50+ years of age. Gender was male or female. 
Combining these characteristics together gives 24 unique applicant profiles, 
however fractional factorial design allowed for 20 profiles to be used in the 
experiment. These profiles were paired and presented in 11 choice cards. 
One card used the same profiles as another card but in reverse order. This 
was done to test for consistency of responses9. A series of scenarios were 
presented to employers who were asked to choose between two hypothetical 
candidates. The scenarios were adjusted to quantify employer preferences 
with regard to the age, gender and childcare responsibilities of potential 
employees.  
 
Stated Preference analysis was then used to examine the preferences or 
values that employers placed on different characteristics of potential job 
applicants. The interviewees were presented with a series of scenarios and 
asked to assume the following: the candidates are being considered for a 
permanent position working on the shop floor; all candidates have the 
minimum necessary qualifications and experience to be employed by your 
company; there are no other significant barriers to their employment; the 
candidates are identical except for the three characteristics presented in the 
profiles. By presenting employers with differing profiles of potential job 
applicants and asking them to indicate their choice (preference), it is possible 
to identify the relative importance they place on certain characteristics like 
gender, age and age of their (youngest) child.  Details were also asked about 
                                                 
9
   Only 4 of the 52 persons interviewed exhibited inconsistency of choice.  
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the makeup of their existing workforce for these jobs in terms of age and 
gender.10 
 
The RPL model was the preferred model for estimating the preference 
structure of the sample frame as the MNL model failed the Hausman-test of 
the IIA assumption. Effects coding was used in the data set for the attributes.    
 
 
Results  
 
Table 1 reports the estimated coefficients from the choices made by the 
survey respondents. The coefficients are interpreted as the parameters of the 
indirect utility function, although the fact that they are confounded with a scale 
parameter means that one cannot directly interpret their numerical value. The 
scale parameter cancels out when calculating the relative proportional effect 
of the estimated coefficients. Coefficient signs show the influence of the 
characteristics on choice probability. A positive value indicates a positive 
preference by employers for the particular characteristic level which means it 
is an advantage for the job applicant. A negative value indicates a negative 
preference and a disadvantage for a job applicant.  
 
The results suggest that there is a statistically significant (at the 1% level) 
positive preference by employers for applicants who are a woman, have no 
major childcare responsibilities and are 25-39 years of age. Solely being a 
woman does not appear to be used by employers as a signal for childbearing 
in the near future. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Additional covariates were examined as possible explanatory factors for employer 
preferences. The covariates were; an alternate specific constant, total number of employees 
at each firm, percentage of women employed at each firm, and if the firm was in an industry 
dominated by women, men or neither gender. All covariates were found to be statistically 
insignificant in their influence on employer preferences.  
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Table 1: Model of Employer Preferences for Recruits  
Variables Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio P-value 
Woman 0.380 0.106 3.562 0.0004 
Under Age 25 0.083 0.149 0.557 0.5777 
Age 25 to 39 0.533 0.155 3.445 0.0006 
Age 40 to 49 -0.233 0.160 -1.459 0.1447 
Age 50 or older -0.383 0.166 -2.309 0.0210 
Child                                     
Aged Under 5 Years -0.668 0.165 -4.044 0.0001 
Child                                       
Aged between 5 to 11 0.012 0.137 0.092 0.9270 
No Children Under 12 0.656 0.155 4.244 0.0000 
Random parameters logit model. 52 respondents, N = 560 with 12  
missing values. McFadden Psuedo-R
2
 = 0.18. 
 
Having a child who is under 5 years old is a disadvantage and highly 
significant (p = 0.0001). Having a child aged 5-11 years old does not influence 
the preference of employers (P = 0.927). Having no childcare responsibilities 
(or only children of 12 or more) was strongly significantly positively correlated 
to the preferences of employers (p = 0.0001). The presence of childcare 
responsibilities were found to be negatively correlated to employer 
preferences and becoming more important as the age of the job seeker‟s 
child(ren) decreased (Figure 1). It is important to note that by disaggregating 
by the age of the youngest child of applicants, the analysis was able to 
identify that it is not children in general but children of pre-school age that are 
the source of disadvantage in seeking employment.  
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Figure 1: Employer’s Relative Preference for Applicants by Childcare 
Responsibilities 
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Normalized to most preferred - No Care Responsibilities.  
 
The impacts from an applicant‟s age proves to be advantageous for the 25 to 
39 age group while a disadvantage for older job applicants, and insignificant 
for younger applicants. This suggests that age is not used as a signal for the 
likelihood of having children. This is not particularly surprising given that the 
age of having a first child was 30 years old in 2005 in the UK (Eurostat, 2008). 
 
Figure 2: Employer’s Relative Preference for Applicants by Age Category 
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Normalized to the most preferred category – Aged 25 to 39.  
 
Figure 2 shows the relative preference of the firms surveyed for the age of job 
applicants. The preference is normalized to the most preferred group, aged 
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between 25 and 39. The other three age categories are less preferred, the 
oldest two groups having a negative preference by employers.  
Analysis of the stated preference questions asked in the face-to-face 
questionnaire produced the following results: 
 Having childcare responsibilities for children age 4 or less has the 
largest negative impact on an employer‟s preference for hiring a job 
applicant.  
 Having childcare responsibilities for children between the ages of 5 to 
11 has little or no impact on an employer‟s preference for hiring a job 
applicant.  
 Having no childcare responsibilities (or no children under 12 years old) 
has a positive impact on an employer‟s preference for hiring a job 
applicant.  
 Being between the ages of 25 and 39 has a large positive impact on an 
employer‟s preference for hiring a job applicant.  
 Being age 40 or older reduces an employer‟s preferences for hiring a 
job applicant. This negative impact increases once the job applicant is 
50 or older.  
 Being a woman increases an employer‟s preference for hiring a job 
applicant.  
 Being a woman creates an advantage that just counter balances, or 
offsets, the disadvantage of being age 50 or older.  
 Being a younger job applicant, age 24 or less, does not impact on an 
employer‟s hiring preferences.  
  The most preferred person to hire is a woman, age 25 to 39, with no 
childcare responsibilities. She is the most “advantaged”.  
 The least preferred person to hire is a man, age 50 or older, with 
childcare responsibilities for children age 4 or less. He is the most 
“disadvantaged”.  
These results would appear to be consistent with statistical discrimination, 
where the presence of young children signalled that the person may have 
another child in the near future, and so take maternity leave, and/or a 
perception of lower productivity among those with young children. The result 
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of a negative preference for those over 50 years old also indicates statistical 
discrimination for older job seekers. 
 
In order to test a hypothesis that two attributes, woman with pre-school age 
child(ren),  may interact and experience a negative preference contrary to or 
in excess of the main attribute preferences found in the analysis, a simple 
count test was conducted. The combined attributes, woman with pre-school 
age child(ren), occurred 145 times. The combined attributes were preferred 
71 times while all other alternatives were selected 74 times.  This indicates 
that no systemic bias against this profile occurred.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Stated preference methods were used to measure the employer preferences 
for potential recruits in terms of gender, age and presence and age of 
children. The results indicate that there are strong employer preferences 
against those: having childcare responsibilities for children under 5 years old; 
and being aged 40 or older, but especially being over 50 years old. Employer 
preferences were found to favour those between the ages of 25 and 39, no 
childcare responsibilities and women. The most preferred person to hire is a 
woman, age 25 to 39, with no childcare responsibilities.  These suggest that 
both older age and presence of very young children may be used as „signals‟ 
by employers which bias them against such potential recruits and hence 
support the apparent use of statistical discrimination.  
 
The presence of childcare responsibilities were found to be negatively 
correlated to employer preferences and became more important as the age of 
the job seeker‟s youngest child decreased. It is important to note that through 
disaggregating by the age of the youngest child of the applicant, the analysis 
was able to identify that it is not children in general but children of pre-school 
age that are the source of disadvantage in seeking employment. What the 
results indicate is that, while there may be supply-side factors leading to 
greater numbers of mothers taking part-time work or leaving work, there are 
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clear demand-side influences that will affect the ability of those with young 
children to find work. This suggests that a key factor in gender differences 
should include the differences between mothers, specifically mothers of young 
children, and other women. 
 
The results support the potential usefulness of Stated Preference methods in 
analysing labour markets, even with relatively small sample sizes (52 
employers in this case). There is considerable scope for additional Stated 
Preference based analysis of other labour market issues, additional attributes 
of job seekers, identifying differences in effects between the perceived 
flexibility of those with children and the perceived likelihood of taking maternity 
leave, the effects of job levels and preferences for part-time versus full-time 
work and the monetarisation of the employer preferences for these and the 
employment attributes considered in this paper. The results of this paper 
suggest that such extensions using Stated Preference methodology would be 
well worthwhile. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Adams, S.J. (2004) Age Discrimination Legislation and the Employment of 
Older Workers, Labor Economics 11, 219-41.  
Altonji, J.G. and Blank, R.M. (1999) „Race and Gender in the Labor Market‟ in 
Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (eds) Handbook of Labor Economics Vol. 3C. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp. 3143-259. 
Altonji, J.G. and Pierret, C.R. (2001) Employer Learning and Statistical 
Discrimination, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 1, 313-50. 
Arrow, K. (1973) „The Theory of Discrimination‟, in Ashenfelter, O. and Rees, 
A. (eds) Discrimination in Labor Markets, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University 
Press, pp. 3-33. 
Becker G.S. (1971) The Economics of Discrimination 2nd ed. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press 
 23  
Ben-Akiva, M.E. and S. Lerman (1985) Discrete Choice analysis: theory and    
application travel demand,  MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.  
Bennett, J. and R. Blamey (2001) The Choice Modelling Approach to 
Environmental Valuation,   Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 
Bertrand, M. and Mullanaithan, S. (2004) Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination, American Economic Review, 94, 991-1013. 
Blau, F. and L. Kahn (2003) Understanding International Differences in the 
Gender Pay Gap, Journal of Labor Economics, 21 106-44. 
Booth, A.L. and van Ours, J. (2008) Job Satisfaction and Family Happiness: 
The Part-time Work Puzzle, Economic Journal, 118, F77-F99. 
Borsch-Supan, A. (2003). Labour Market Effects of Population Ageing. 
Labour, vol. 17 (special issue), 5-44. 
Budig, M.J. and England, P. (2001) The wage penalty for motherhood, 
American Sociological Review, 66, 2: 204-25. 
Carlsson, F. and Martinsson, P. (2003) Design techniques for stated 
preference methods in health economics, Health Economics, 12, 281-94. 
Cohen, P.N. and Huffman, M.L. (2003) „Occupational segregation and the 
devaluation of women‟s work across U.S. labor markets‟, Social Forces, 81, 3, 
881-908. 
Dex, S., Joshi, H., Macran, S. and McCulloch, A. (1998) Women‟s 
employment transitions around child bearing, Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics, 60, 1: 79-98. 
Dex S. and Scheibl F., (2002) SMEs and Flexible Working Arrangements. 
Bristol, The Policy Press. 
Doeringer P. and Piore, M. (1971) Internal Labor Markets and Manpower 
Analysis. Lexinton MA, Lexington Books. 
Duncan, C. (2001) Ageism, early exit and the rationality of age-based 
discrimination, in Glover, I. and Branine, M. (eds.) Ageism in Work and 
Employment. Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Felstead A., Ashton D., Green F., (2000) Are Britain‟s workplace skills 
becoming more unequal? Cambridge Journal of Economics. 24, 6, 709-27 
 24  
Gregory, M. and Connelly, S. (2008) The Price of Reconciliation: Part-Time 
Work, Families and Women's Satisfaction, Economic Journal, 118, F1–F7. 
Grimshaw, D. (2000) Public sector employment, wage inequality and the 
gender pay ratio in the UK, International Review of Applied Economics, 14, 
4: 427-48. 
Hakim, C. (2004) Key Issues in Women’s Work, 2nd Edition. London, 
Glasshouse Press. 
Hensher, David A., John M. Rose, and William Greene, (2005) Applied 
Choice Analysis – A Primer. Cambridge University Press, UK. 
Howell, S., and Sims, R. (1994) Survey Research and Racially Charged 
Elections: The Case of David Duke in Louisiana, Political Behavior, 16, 219-
36. 
Hurd, M. (1990) Research on the elderly: economic status, retirement, and 
consumption and saving, Journal of Economic Literature, 28, 2, 565-637. 
Johnson R. W. (2007) Managerial Attitudes Toward Older Workers: A Review 
of the Evidence, Discussion Paper 07-05, The Urban institute, Washington 
DC. 
Joshi, H. and Paci. P. (1998) Unequal Pay for Women and Men: Evidence 
from the British Birth Cohort Studies. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Joshi, H., Paci, P. and Waldfogel, J. (1999) „The wages of motherhood: better 
or worse?‟ Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23, 543-64. 
Lancaster, K. 1966, A New Approach to Consumer Theory, Journal of Political 
Economy, 74, 132-57.  
Lazear, E.P. and Rosen, S. (1990) Male-Female Wage Differentials in Job 
Ladders, Journal of Labor Economics, 8, S106-23. 
Leitham, S., McQuaid, R.W. and J.D. Nelson (2000) The Influence of 
Transport on Industrial Location Choice: A Stated Preference Experiment, 
Transportation Research A, 34, 515-35. 
Levitt, S.D. (2004) Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence fro Weakest 
Link, Journal of Law and Economics 48, 431-52. 
Lundberg, S., & Rose, E. (2000). Parenthood and the earnings of married 
men and women, Labour Economics, 7, 689-710. 
Louviere, J.J., D. Hensher and J. Swait (2000) Stated Choice Methods: 
Analysis and Application, University Press. Cambridge. 
 25  
Malo, M.A. and Muñoz-Bullon, F. (2007) Breaks in Women's Careers due to 
Family Reasons: A Long-Term Perspective, Departamento de Economía de 
la Empresa, Business Economics Series 01 Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid. 
Manning, A. and Petrongolo, B. (2008) The Part-Time Pay Penalty for Women 
in Britain, Economic Journal, 118, F28-F51. 
Manning, A. and Robinson, H. (2004) Something in the way she moves: a 
fresh look at an old gap, Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 2,169-88. 
Manski, C. (1977) The Structure of Random Utility Models, Theory and 
Decision, 8, 229-54.  
McFadden, D. (1973) Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice 
Behavior, in P. Zarembka (ed.) Frontiers in Econometrics, Academic Press. 
New York.  
Mincer, J. (1974) Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. New York: National 
Bureau of Economic Research.  
Neumark, D. (1988) „Employers‟ discriminatory behavior and the estimation of 
wage discrimination‟, Journal of Human Resources, 23, 279-98. 
Oaxaca, R.L. and Ransom, M.R. (1994) „On discrimination and the 
decomposition of wage differentials‟, Journal of Econometrics, 61, 5-21. 
Olsen, W. and Walby, S. (2004) Modelling gender pay gaps, Working Paper 
Series 17, Equal Opportunities Commission, Manchester. 
Paull, G. (2006) The Impact of Children on Women‟s Work, Fiscal Studies, 27, 
4, 473-512. 
Paull, G. (2008) Children and Women‟s Hours of Work, Economic Journal, 
118, F8–F27. 
Phelps, E.S. (1972) The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, American 
Economic Review, 62, 659-77. 
Stewart, M.B., and Greenhalgh C. (1984) The work history patterns and 
occupational attainment of women, The Economic Journal, 94, 493-519.  
Waldfogel, J. (1997) „The effect of children on women‟s wages‟, American 
Sociological Review, 62, 209-17. 
Waldfogel, J. (1998) „The family gap for young women in the United States 
and Britain: can maternity leave make a difference?‟ Journal of Labor 
Economics, 16, 3, 505-45. 
 26  
Walker, B., Marsh, A., Wardman, M. (2002) Modelling Tenants' Choices in the 
Public Rented Sector: A Stated Preference Approach, Urban Studies, 39, 
665-88. 
Weichselbaumer, D. (2003) Sexual orientation discrimination in hiring, Labour 
Economics, 10, 6, 29-42. 
Wright, R.E. and Ermisch, J.F. (1991) „Gender discrimination in the British 
labour market: a reassessment‟, The Economic Journal, 101, 508-22. 
 
 
Annex 
Illustration A1 below shows one of the choice sets that employers were asked 
to consider in the face-to-face interviews. The possible job applicant 
characteristics were gender, age and age of their child(ren). The respondent 
was asked to compare the two candidates by the given characteristics and 
select the preferred one or to select neither if they would be preferred to leave 
the post vacant. Notice that the two candidates are both women but are 
different in age and in childcare responsibilities.  
 
Illustration A1:  Example of a Choice Card presented to respondents.  
Card  
Candidate A Candidate B Neither 
Gender Female Female 
Leave the 
position 
vacant 
Age 40 - 49 years old 
less than 25 years 
old 
Care Duties 
Child(ren) aged 4 or 
less 
Child(ren) aged 5 to 
11 
    
For Card 2 which candidate do you prefer?  Candidate A, B or Neither 
 
